I. Introduction
The lifting of martial law in 1987 was hailed as a great transition of Taiwanese politics and society. While some limitations still exist in continuing Nationalist Party (KMT) dominance of the central government and the government news media, as well as the slow pace of privatization of public enterprises, the political transformation was swift and peaceful. However, its impact on the Taiwanese economy, which has been liberalizing gradually and consistently since the mid-1960s, are not clear and still not properly examined. This paper examines the indexes of civil liberties, political rights, and economic freedom to investigate the impact of democratization and liberalization on the Taiwanese economy.
To our knowledge, no study has addressed these economic questions empirically or theoretically, either for Taiwan or for developing countries in general, using time series analysis.
Empirically, it is difficult to study economic transition over time, since long-run economic statistics of reasonable quality are not available in most developing countries. Fortunately, Taiwan has been blessed with rich economic and industrial statistics, which enable us to apply the advanced econometric methods on complicated economic analysis.
In Sections II, we trace the origin of the authoritarian regime in Taiwan from the prewar period, and relate how it was continued after the World War II. We then show in Section III how Taiwan's liberalization was first prompted by the foreign influences in the early 1960s, and then continued to the following three decades through export promotion policy. We reason that as the economy developed and the language problem eased, the younger generalization of Taiwanese, who were educated under the Chinese system, started socially and politically assertive.
Diplomatic setbacks and external events finally led to the lifting of martial law in 1987. Section IV presents external and internal factors which accelerated democratization and liberalization after 1987.
Section V defines three kinds of freedom, which are measured quantitatively by some world watch organizations, and confirm the progress of freedom in Taiwan since the mid-1977.
Section VI examines some of the previous studies on the impact of liberalization on economic performance and structural changes.
To investigate the impact of the lifting of martial law on economic activities using time series analysis in Sections VII and VIII, we have chosen six important and popular economic series: Real GDP, real GDP per worker, real money supply, real government expenditures, inward direct foreign investment, and outward investment. Since time series regression analysis requires stationarity of the series, we first test these series for the stationarity with structural changes in Section VII. We assume that the lifting of martial law in 1987 is a big bang of liberalization and test statistically whether it has significant influences on the Taiwanese economy. Thus, in section VIII, we examine the statistical significance of one time change in 1987 and structural changes in the constant term and slope of these time series before and after
1987.
As shown in the first several sections, the Taiwanese economy has been opening up continuously since mid-1960s, the post-martial law era may be considered as a gradual transition of the Taiwanese economy instead of a discrete big bang break. Hence, we also examine in Section IX the possibility of smooth transition of these six series, using nonlinear smooth transition model of logistic functions. Some concluding remarks are in the last section.
II. The Origin of the Authoritarian Regime in Taiwan
Modern Taiwanese economic development started after Taiwan was ceded from China to Japan in 1895. For fifty-one years until the end of the World War II in 1945, Japan developed
Taiwan from a feudalistic pre-modern economy into a modern capitalist society. Guided by Taiwan's comparative advantage in the Japanese prewar empire, Japanese capitalists invested heavily in developing Taiwanese agriculture (Hsiao, 1997) . For six agricultural products (Bananas, canned pineapples, sugar, sweet potatoes, rice, peanuts) Taiwan ranked within the ten largest producers in the world by the end of the 1930s (ibid., 507). After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Taiwan's industrialization started in earnest. A major hydraulic power plant was completed in 1934, triggered the development of industry of aluminum, shipping, pulp, fertilizer, oil and fat, and others (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996, 119-121) . Before the World War II, the Taiwanese economy completed the phase of primary-export-led growth, and the industry was already in the stage of import substitution, during which economic policy of self-sufficiency was adopted. Basic social and economic infrastructure, like modern transportation, communication, schools for all levels, irrigation and flood control, and electric power generating facilities were already in place at the end of the war (Ho, 1978; Lin, 1973) .
According to Maddison's data (1995) , by the early 1940s, real GDP per capita of Taiwan, along with Korea, was higher than all the Asian countries, except Japan 1 (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1999a , Figure 1 ).
1 In a report to the United States Congress, Conlon Associates (1959, p. 139) wrote that "Taiwan did not enter the post war era without advantages. Progress under Japan had been extensive. Prior to World War II, the Taiwanese had a standard of living second only to that of Japan itself in Asian. The people had acquired many industrial and agrarian skills. The years immediately after 1945, however, were years of chaos…."
As the Sino-Japanese War erupted in 1937, Taiwan entered into the period of war-time controlled economy and society. Japan's declaration of war against the Allied Forces in 1940 caused the total mobilization of national resources and complete control of the Taiwanese economic and social activities (Lin, 1996) . When the war ended in 1945, the Nationalist Chinese took over Taiwan and confiscated major Japanese industries and reorganized them as government and KMT Party enterprises. Taiwanese economy was mostly in ruin due to allied air raids, and inflation was rampant. The Nationalist Government was defeated in the Civil War in China and reestablished itself on Taiwan in 1949. Martial law was declared in that year, and
Wartime Temporary Provisions was declared and the Constitution was suspended. Under these conditions, the government perpetuated the strictly controlled economy of the Japanese wartime period (Twu, 1975, 499) Elsewhere we have divided Taiwanese postwar economic development into six stages:
The Chaotic Period (August 1945 (August -1949 , the Transition Period , the Recovery and Import Substitution Period (1954 Period ( -1963 , Take-off and Export Promotion Period (1964-1973) ; the Second Import Substitution Period (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , Accelerated Growth and High-tech Industrialization Period (1980-) (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996, 222, 231, 248) . As the names imply, each period corresponds to gradual opening and liberalization of the economy.
In the 1950s, the KMT government control of Taiwanese economy and politics was omnipresent and omnipotent. 4 In production, it even monopolized daily items like liquor, beer, tobacco, sugar, salt, and about 90 percent of petroleum and its products. It had a majority of shares in the production of food, chemicals and chemical products, metal and metal products, and others, which included from bagasse board to shipbuilding. In the distribution and financial sectors, the government monopolized railroads, all the communication facilities, commercial and development banks, and external trade (ibid., 236, 256) . The government monopoly of the economy also reflected in the government revenues and expenditures. In the 1950s and long afterward, government revenues relied mostly on indirect taxes and monopoly. Almost 80% of the central government expenditures, or 65% of central and local government expenditures, were on the defense and general administration (ibid., 233).
During 1950s, however, some new infrastructures for future development were laid.
Massive U.S. economic and military aid was infused into the country, especially in the electric power industry and agricultural development (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996, 233-234) , the Seventh Fleet kept peace and stability in Taiwan area, land reform was implemented in 1949 and almost completed in 1953 (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996, 224-226) , inflation was practically subsided (ibid., 245), the first four-year economic plan was launched in 1953 (Li and Yeh, 1982) . Thus, by 1959, the U.S. Agency of International Development (AID) "projected 'an accelerated economic development program' for Taiwan, based upon a belief that the conditions of rapid progress already were in existence and that a stronger effort should be made by the Chinese government to create in Taiwan a 'showcase' of the achievement possible by a free economy" (Jacoby, 1966, 134) . The director of the U.S. AID Mission then proposed an 8-Point Program of reform. It included "noninflationary fiscal and monetary policies, tax reform, unification of foreign exchange rates, liberalized exchange controls, establishment of utility commission and of investment banking machinery, and also the sale of government enterprises to private owners" (ibid., 134). 4 The monopoly of government and KMT Party enterprises in Taiwan has continued well into the 1990s, despite the intermittent talks of privatization. See Chen, et al. (1991); , . Also see reports by Underwood (1997) 
III. Continuous Liberalization and Democratization
The economic and financial reform programs paved the way for export expansion, 6 which has continued until today. However, economic liberalization proceeded only gradually. 7 Export processing zones was started in 1966. In the 1970s, import controls were relaxed in 1970, the bond market was established and rice-fertilizer barter program was discontinued in 1974, and floating exchange rate system was introduced in 1978. In the 1980s, trade mark and patent laws were amended in 1982, tariffs and import controls were further reduced and capital market was liberalized in 1983. Reform had accelerated in the mid-1980s, bank interest rates were deregulated and the labor standard law was published in 1985, value-added tax, which is fairer than tariffs, was implemented in 1986.
In general, the wartime authoritarian controlled economy and the government policy priority of "recovering the mainland," rather than promoting local economic and social 5 Hsu (1997, 55-57) . The Statute was revised more than ten times during the three decades, and expanded from 35 to 80 items. The major contents consisted of tax reduction, procurement of industrial land, and coordinated development of public enterprises (ibid., 57). The statute's effectiveness of encouraging investment was mixed (ibid., 88). 6 Elsewhere we have pointed out that the advance to export expansion policy was not so much due to small domestic market nor shortage of natural resources, as not all smaller countries adopt export expansion policy (WDR, 1987, Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996, 256) . 7 The following chronology from 1952 to 1995 is based on Li (1988, Appendix) . For the summary table of financial reform before 1997, see Hsu and Yang (1997, 168) . development 8 kept Taiwan's industrial sector from recovering fully to the prewar peak of the Japanese period until the end of the 1950s. 9 When it recovered, however, the possibility of "an accelerated economic development" for Taiwan was envisaged, and economic reform was brought about by external influences. 10 Rapid economic growth then ensued. The reform began with consolidating the multiple exchange rates into a single rate, and subsequent reform programs have been catered to the purpose of promoting exports. The success of export promotion policy is due to the fact that, among other factors, Taiwanese economic development was parallel to the growth of Japanese multinational corporations, and the subsequent formation of the Pacific trade triangle among Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.
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Along with the progress of economic liberalization came the political reform. In the 1950s, the Chinese who replaced the Japanese in the government did not speak Taiwanese, and the Taiwanese became the silent majority. The terror of the 228 Incident of 1947 further silenced and alienated most of the Taiwanese. 12 However, the language problem eased gradually after the next generation of Taiwanese, who were educated under the Chinese system, started being socially and politically active in the mid-1970s (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996, 223, 252-253) .
They were middle class intellectuals who were exposed to the Western democracy and society (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, 10-11) . They started questioning the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and formed political opposition groups. External events also played a decisive factor in spurring political reform. Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, Japan and the 8 Jacoby, 1966, 137, 144, 169, 221, 223 . In evaluating the "extent of leadership commitment to economic development" among 74 developing countries in the period of 1957 -1962 , Adelman and Morris (1967 placed Taiwan only at 55 percentile, slightly better than average. Their evaluation of Taiwan's economic indicators (18 variables) is generally higher than that of political system indicators (7 variables) during that period. (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1998b) .
9 Hsiao and Hsiao, 1998a, 98 . Using DYMIMIC (Dynamic Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes) econometric model, Hsu (1997, 82) reported that the degree of industrialization in the postwar Taiwan exceeded the Japanese period only after 1966. Taiwanese standard of living did not recover to the prewar peak until the mid-1960s (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1998a; Wu, 1991) . 10 Hsiao and Hsiao (1996, 258) . The importance of external factors in Taiwan's economic and political transition was also emphasized in Shiau (1994) .
11 Hsiao and Hsiao (1996, 258, 264-269,283-285) ; M. Hsiao (1998); Twu (1995) . 
IV. Post-1987 Reform
After 1987, the pace of both political democratization and economic liberalization accelerated. 14 In 1991, the "Temporary Provisions" was abolished and the "Period of National
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion" was terminated, ending the 42-year long state of war with the Chinese communist government. In 1994, the governor of Taiwan and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were directly elected by popular votes, instead of being appointed by the "Central Government." Finally, the president and the vice president of Taiwan were elected directly by the Taiwanese people for a four-year term in 1996. In 1997, the newly elected National Assembly voted to reduce the power of the "provincial government" of Taiwan, a step considered to be eliminating the fiction of Taiwan being a province of China.
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Similar pace of reform occurred in economic front. Externally, the change of global trade policy environment accelerated the process of economic liberalization in Taiwan. To curb the persistent trade deficits of the United States and trade surpluses of Japan, Germany, and to a lesser degree, Taiwan and South Korea, the Plaza Agreement of G5 in 1985 allowed an orderly factories had emerged (Hu, 1983, 391-392; Hsiao and Hsiao, 1999b) . We submit that the change is attributable to the rise of Chinese speaking Taiwanese youths (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1999b In general, after the lifting of martial law, both democratization and liberalization proceeded hand-in-hand through internal and external pressures. However, democratization appears to happen in a big bang, while liberalization occurred gradually. Changes in Taiwan's democratization and liberalization processes are reflected in various freedom ratings by world watch organizations. Figure 1 shows three indexes of freedom: Civil liberties (icl), political rights (ipr), and economic freedom (ief). The terms will be explained in the following section.
16 Hsiao and Hsiao (1995) . Also see Baldwin (1993) . 17 The following is a very good example of gradual nature in economic liberalization in Taiwan. Before 1960, there was only one rate for bank deposit and bank loan. In 1975, the bank deposit rate was set by the Central Bank, while the Banking Association, with the approval of the government, determined the bank loan rate. In 1985, each commercial bank set its own loan rates within certain upper and lower limits. In 1986, the requirement of the upper limit was lifted, and in 1989, the requirement of the lower limit was also lifted. Thus, after 1989, all banks can set their own interest rates. Hsu and Yang (1997, 168, Table 5 .4).
All three indexes increased over time. Note that, icl is generally lower 18 than ief before 1987, but it became higher after 1987. In the following sections, we will define icl and ief, and examine the effects of icl and ief on economic growth.
V. Quantitative Measurements of Freedom
There are several definitions and measurements of democracy and freedom (Siermann, 1998) . Here, we adopt the Gastil approach, which provides long-run consistent ratings. We took the indexes for civil liberties and political rights from "The Comparative Survey of
Freedom" published in January-February issues of Freedom Review from 1983 to 1997, supplemented by Gastil (1982) for ratings from 1977 to 1982. Civil liberties are defined as "the freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state" (FR, 1966, 6 ). It has thirteen checklist items, including the independence of the news media, freedom of opinion and religion, right of fair trial, and the number of political prisoners (Gastil, 1979, 15-24) . The light line in Figure 1 shows the civil liberties index over the years. Figure 1 here
We also considered political rights, which "enable people to participate freely in the political process," that is, "the polity chooses the authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional or local community." (ibid., 5-6). It has eight to nine checklist items, including the existence of significant opposition parties and openness of voting procedures. They are rated on a seven-category scale, shown as the heavy dotted line 19 in Figure 1 . Note that, for Taiwan, the index of political rights (ipr) is either lower than or equal to the index of civil liberties (icl), however, they generally move together.
In the freedom ratings, the average of category numbers for civil liberties and political rights in each country is then classified into three major categories, "free," "partly free," and "not free." As may be expected from the previous three sections of this paper, Taiwan was rated "not free" from 1973, the year the ratings started, to 1976 (Gastil, 1982, 40) , "partial free" from 1977 to 1996, and finally has become "free" after 1997. Taiwan is one of a few countries that have gone through, and advanced through, all these three categories since 1973.
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Economic freedom index (ief) is a weighted average of 17 components: Money and inflation (four items), government operations and regulations (six items), takings and discriminatory taxation (three items), and restrictions on international exchange (four items) compiled by Gwartney, et al. (1996, xv) 
The ief (the marked solid line) in Figure 1 shows a near perfect fit, showing a rising trend of economic freedom over the years, slowly at the early years, rapidly after 1987. Using equation
(1), we have extrapolated the indexes for the last two years. As can be seen from the diagram, like the index for political freedom (ipr), the ief index increased steadily. In fact, Taiwan is one of a few countries that have the index of economic freedom advanced from middle-rated countries in 1977 to one of the 15 highest-rated countries in the world 22 in 1995.
We may point out that Taiwanese experience of transition from authoritarian to democratic regime is not unique. In fact, Taiwan follows the world trend. In 1986, the political freedom in the world was evenly divided into "free," "partly free" and "not free" countries: 56, 56, and 55. The composition changed considerably in 1996. 76 countries were free, 62, partly free, and 53, not free (Karatnycky, 1996, 5) . The condition of freedom in a country can change over the years. Taiwan is one of a few countries that its gain of freedom has been proceeded linearly upward.
VI. Some Previous Studies on the Impact of Liberalization
There are many studies related to economic performance and liberalization. The consensus is that they are generally positively related. Recently, Aswicahyono, et al. (1996) study the case of Indonesian liberalization since the mid-1980s. They found that there is no clear tendency of industrial concentration by domestic and foreign enterprises due to freer market entry and rising import competition. There are decline in state enterprises, increase in the private sector, slight changes in the firm size, steady growth in medium-sized firms at the expense of larger firms, and little impact on spatial distribution of manufacturing activity. Finally, they found that the total factor productivity (TFP) growth for selected industries was increasing, but it
is not clear what the impact of liberalization on TFP.
In Taiwan, while there are some discussions on the impact of liberalization, few related specifically to the effects of martial law on the economy. Chou, et al. (1997) applied single country computable general equilibrium model to assess the effects of trade liberalization (in their case, joining GATT) on Taiwan. They showed that, from 1971 to 1986, and to 1992, the average tariff rate in Taiwan was reduced from 12.25% to 6.96%, and to 4.87%; the import duty rate was also reduced from 13.51% to 9.31%, and to 6.74%. Their most optimistic simulation shows that multilateral liberalization of Taiwan by joining GATT will increase real GDP by 1.09 % and total consumption by 2.88 %. However, the agricultural and motor vehicle sectors will be adversely affected.
The above two studies do not specifically deal with the impact of economic liberalization due to a sudden change in the political climate, like the lifting of martial law. Chang (1996a Chang ( , 1996b ) is more specific. He compares the impact of liberalization before and after the mid1980s, especially 1987. He observes that, after 1987, the Taiwanese economy has changed "quite visibly" (Chang, 1996a, 26) , without, quite curiously, ever attributing the changes to the lifting of martial law. The real GDP share of manufacturing industry, which faced the rising labor cost due to the labor protection law, peaked at 38% in 1986-87, and then declined to about 31% in 1993 and after. On the other hand, rising consumer income expanded the service sector.
Its real GDP share increased from 49% to about 58% during the same period. Liberalization enhances competition in domestic and foreign markets, resulting in industrial specialization.
Thus, inside the manufacturing industry, the real GDP share of capital goods and durable consumer-goods industries exceeded the share of the non-durable consumer-goods industry for the first time in 1989 (39% vs. 37%). By 1994, the gap increased steadily to 44% vs. 29%, reflecting the technological advancement of the economy (ibid., 29-32).
Liberalization lifts the import restriction and local content requirements. 1962-1987 period and 1988-1997 period without, like Chang, attributing the changes to the lifting of martial law. He found that the income elasticities of demand, the labor productivity growth rates, and the labor reallocation effects for both agricultural and industrial sectors all decreased while those of the service sector increased.
While the above studies of the impact of liberalization provide a valuable insight and help us understand the expected results of changes in economic environments and policy reform, the major problem is that, as in any input-output models or simulation models, the analyses are based on descriptive statistics, no statistical inferences are applied. The calculated results of the variables naturally differ from year to year or period to period. They may increase or decrease.
Even if one finds that the change is large, it may not be statistically significant, implying that the change is merely due to some random factors not related to the lifting of martial law. On the other hand, although the change may seem to be small, it may be statistically significant, meaning that the change is due to some systematic factors, like the lifting of martial law, and the results of changes in underlining basic social and economic characteristics. Thus, we propose a time series analysis and test the structural changes of the variables statistically.
VII. Tests of Stationarity with Structural Changes
We have seen that all three indicators of freedom in Taiwan have improved over time.
We also have seen that political rights and civil liberties increased suddenly in 1987 and afterward. We would like to know whether these political events in 1987 affect the structure of the economy.
In this section we examine the changes in the Taiwanese [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] , to eliminate the shock of the first oil price crisis. 23 The series ypw is calculated from the real GDP (that is, deflated by GDP deflator) divided by the number of persons of working age (15-64). The series m1 and expd are the nominal money supply (M1) and the total government expenditures. Both nominal series were divided by the GDP deflator (1991 = 1), respectively, to obtain real M1 and real expd series.
The Perron test in time series (Perron, 1989 ) is an appropriate method to examine the stationarity (no unit-root) of time series with the structure changes due to the lifting of martial law in 1987. We test unit-root with one-time break and changes in the intercept and slope of each time series. The test equation is, y t = a 0 + µ 1 DP t + µ 2 DL t + a 2 t + µ 3 t*DL t + a 1 y t-1 +
where y t is natural logarithm of a time series, DP t is a pulse dummy variable, taking 1 at year 1987 (for one-time break, t B = 1986) and 0 otherwise. It is the dummy for the possibility of onetime pulse or break in the year 1987. DL t is a level dummy variable, taking 1 for 1987 and after, and 0 otherwise. It is the dummy variable for changes in the level of y t for 1987 and after as compared with the level before 1987. Variable t is time trend, t*DL t is an interaction variable to measure the structural change in the slope (* shows multiplication), y t-1 is the one-period lag dependent variable, and ∆y t-i is the i th lag of the first-difference of dependent variable. The value of lag length k is chosen by following the method suggested in Perron (1989) and Enders (1995) . λ in Table 1 is the proportion of the observations prior to the break to the total number of observations. Table 1 here
For a unit-root test, the null hypothesis is H 0 : a 1 = 1 against the alternative hypothesis, H 1 : a 1 < 1. All other coefficients are tested for the null hypothesis of the coefficient being zero against the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is non-zero. The OLS estimated coefficients, the t-statistics, and adjusted coefficients of determination (adj R 2 ) are listed in Table   1 . For convenience, the numerical results in Table 1 are summarized and interpreted in Table 2 . Table 2 here Table 2 , we find that three series, gdp, ypw, and dfi are stationary, as the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected either at 1% or 5% level. The other three series, outinv, m1, and expd, are non-stationary. The gdp series is a trend stationary series with significant structural changes in constant term and slope, without significant pulse. The ypw series is also a trend stationary series with significant structural changes in the constant, slope, and pulse. The dfi series is not trend stationary, and has no significant structural changes in constant, slope, or pulse. For other series, m1, expd, and outinv, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root at the 10% level. They are not stationary series, but have significant structural changes in constant, slope (m1), and pulse (expd). The regression results of these non-stationary series should be interpreted with caution.
The Perron test shows the properties of time series. We found all the series, except dfi present structural changes of one kind or other. These structural changes can be considered as those induced by the lifting of martial law in 1987. However, the general practice is to reexamine the structural changes without the terms of testing unit-root in equation (2). For this purpose, we will present the next two sections.
VIII. Tests of Structural Changes with Regression
We first assume that the structural changes in the above time series are due to a big bang effect in 1987 by using linear regression with time and dummy variables. The model is, y t = a 0 + µ 1 DP t + µ 2 DL t + a 1 t + µ 3 t*DL t + ε t
The estimated results are presented in Table 3 . Among the six series, each one has two estimated results. Part A estimates equation (3) -
In Taiwan, the second oil price crisis (1979) was much less sever than the first (1973), as per capita GDP growth rate did not dip, the inflation rate was well in control, and balance of trade did not become negative (Hsiao and Insert Table 3 here
We found that there are pulses only in the government expenditure (expd) and outward investment (outinv). There are no pulses in other series, that is, no significant dips in 1987. All the series have an upward shift in constant term, and the level of the series is significantly different before and after 1987. There are, to our surprise, downward shifting in the slopes of real GDP (gdp), real money supply (m1), and inward direct foreign investment (dfi). For these three series, the growth rates have decreased after 1987. There also has downward shifting tendency in the slopes of real GDP per worker (ypw) and outward foreign investment (outinv), but they are not significant.
In general, there are different responses of economic time series to the lifting of martial law. While the level of the series has increased, the growth rate has decreased after 1987. The decrease in growth rates may be due to factors other than the lifting of martial law, such as increases in land price, shortage of labor supply and rapid wage increase, resulting in increase in
Taiwanese outward foreign direct investment to China and Southeast Asia, and decrease in domestic capital formation. 24 Cearly, after mid-1980s, the Taiwanese economy has gradually matured, and the growth rate of series, especially real GDP, has started to taper off.
Our finding of the decrease in the growth rate of real GDP and real per worker GDP is not consistent with the findings from the cross-country data compiled by Gwartney et el. (1996, xxiii) . They reveal that, so far as economic freedom is concerned, the effect is clearly positive.
The 1994 per capita GDP of six persistently high-rated countries from 1975 to 1995 are Hong Kong, Switzerland, Singapore, the United States, Canada, and Germany. The average per capita GDP 25 is US$ 16,600. They then compare these with the nine persistently low-rated countries during the same period. The nine countries are Somalia, Zambia, Hungary, Romania, Brazil, Hsiao, 1996, 253-254) . 24 We owe this explanation to a referee. Chang (1996a, 26) has pointed out that the Taiwanese economy reversed its characteristics after 1987. "Export expansion slackened while domestic demand strengthened; imports shot up. .. The dampening of exports reversed manufacturing-industry growth, resulting in as appreciable reduction in its share of real GDP... The rapid expansion of domestic demand spurred vigorous development of the service sector…" A slowdown in exports may result in slowdown in GDP growth rates. However, Chang also found that, for shorter period, the real GDP growth rate was 6.7% from 1981 to 1985 and 8.1% from 1986 to 1994 (ibid., 47) , as compared with our estimated results which shows 7.3% from 1977 to 1986 and 6.4% from 1987 to 1997 (see equation 1B in Table 3 ).
Syria, Uganda, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. The average per capita GDP is only US$ 2,600. The average growth rate for persistently high-rated countries is 2.6%, while that of persistently lowrated countries is -0.6%. Thus, from this very crude comparison, we may expect a positive correlation between increase in economic freedom and per capita GDP growth rate. As we have pointed out in the previous section, their cross-country analysis does not take other factors into consideration and relation between economic growth and liberalization may also depend on the stage of economic development.
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IX. Tests of Smooth Transition
The tests of structural changes we have applied in the previous section assume that the changes occurred in 1987. Could these changes also be interpreted as a smooth transition? In this section, we would like to take a step further to examine this possibility. We will employ the logistic smooth transition regression model (LSTR) explained in Granger and Terasvirta (1993) to test the six time series. There are advantages of using LSTR model. First, it does not require to set a priori assumption on specific time of the break. Second, the mid-time of transition, the speed of adjustment, and the structural changes of level and slope are all incorporated into one model.
The model is specified as follows:
is a logistic function of time in the unit interval. The coefficient γ is the smoothness parameter. If it is positive and small, then the model transition occurs smoothly. The coefficient τ is the location parameter that determines the midpoint of transition. Table 4 shows the estimated results of the six time series using the nonlinear least squares method (NLS). The results are summarized in the last column of the table. We find that the 25 GDP per capita figures are measured in 1985 U.S. dollars, and are updates of the Summers and Heston data derived by the purchasing power parity method. (Gwartney, 1996, xxiii) . 26 In the original version of this paper, we have presented a section on the relationship between civil liberties, economic freedom, and endogenous growth. Since our data consist of only 20 years, we have decided to treat the impact of freedom on long-run economic growth in a separate paper. estimated γ is positive and significant in gdp, ypw, m1, and outinv series. Hence, we may say that real GDP, real GDP per worker, real money supply, and outward foreign investment may also be interpreted as having a smooth transition from 1977 to 1997. Table 4 here
For real GDP and real money supply, smooth transition occurred in both constant term and slope. As in the previous section, the level moved up and the growth rate decreased smoothly. For real GDP per worker and outward foreign investment, smooth transition occurred only in the constant term, that is, only the level moved upward smoothly. These findings are consistent with those we have found in Table 3 . As we have observed in the previous sections, economic liberalization occurred slowly over three decades. Thus, we consider that the interpretation of the smooth transition, rather than the big bang, is more appropriate for these economic variables. Notice also that for these four series, the midpoint of transition, τ, occurs at 9 to 11. Since we assign t = 0 at 1977, the implied τ is around 1986 to 1988. This means that the smooth transition have occurred around the midpoint of the sample, which is what we have expected.
The estimated γ for inward direct foreign investment (dfi) and government expenditures (expd) are not significant at the 10% level, hence, there is no smooth transition. In view of deregulation and openness of the domestic market for foreign investment, sudden claims of entitlement by people, and increase in expenditures for social and economic infrastructures, inward direct foreign investment and government expenditures increased suddenly and considerably after 1987. These factors may contribute to the non-smooth transition of these series.
X. Some Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined the origin of Taiwan's authoritarian regime by tracing back to the Japanese period, and discussed the external and internal factors which prompted the authoritarian regime to reform its economic policy for rapid economic growth. We also considered the process of economic liberalization and the external and internal factors that led to the lifting of martial law. We see the accelerated liberalization and democratization after martial law was lifted in 1987.
Our observations that economic liberalization occurred gradually and democratization happened rather abruptly have been confirmed by the indexes of civil liberties, political rights, and economic freedom compiled by some international organizations which compared various aspects of freedom in other countries. We then reviewed some literature on the impact of economic liberalization on economic performance and structural changes. We found that the previous findings are valuable and informative in understanding the impact. However, they are mainly analysis of descriptive statistics, devoid of statistical inferences.
We have chosen six economic time series to test their stationarity and structural changes.
Among them, three series, real GDP, real per worker GDP, and direct foreign investment are trend stationary. They show no one-time pulse in 1987, but have increase in the constant term.
The growth rates of real GDP and direct foreign investment decreased after 1987, but no change for the growth rate of real per worker GDP. The first two series also show a smooth transition over time, but not for the third series.
The other three variables, namely, real money supply M1, total government expenditures, and outward investment are not trend stationary. Hence, the regression results must be interpreted with caution. For levels, all three of them increased with statistical significance, and for the growth rate, all have decreased, but only the money supple has decreased statistically significantly. In general, all six series we have tested show increase in the constant terms, but either no change or decrease in the growth rates after 1987. Increase in constant terms mean that the levels of the values of these six time series data have increased after martial law was lifted.
However, their rates of growth have not increased probably due to changes in international trading environment not specifically related to the lifting of martial law. (-2.15) (1.84) (1.67)n (-0.62)n (-2.39) Notes: 1. t-value is in the parentheses, n = not significant at 10% level. 2. For all coefficients, except a1, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient = 0 in the t-test. 3. a and b denote that we can reject H0: a1 = 1 (a unit-root) at 1% and 5% level, respectively. At l = 0.5, the critical values are -4.90, -4.24, and -3.96 at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (See Perron, 1989) n y a n y b y a 6 expd n n d y b y c n Notes: y = yes, n = no. a, b, and c = significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. d = significant at 15% level.
